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The Role of Special Interest Groups in the
Supreme Court Nomination of
Robert Bork
By William G. Myers 11*
On July 1, 1987, President Reagan announced his nomination of
Judge Robert Heron Bork for the position vacated by retired Associate
Supreme Court Justice Lewis Powell. On October 23, 1987, the United
States Senate voted not to confirm the nomination by a vote of forty-two
yeas to fifty-eight nays.1 The presiding officer ordered the notification of
the President,' thus concluding the extended debate on the nomination of
Judge Bork. This Article examines the extraordinary activities of special
interest groups during the Bork nomination, including the initial attack
by the opposition and followed by the responsive efforts of Bork's
supporters.
Article II, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution states that the
President "shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court . . .,
Throughout the hearings in the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and
the debate on the Senate floor, as well as in the media and among the
citizenry in general, a good deal of discussion took place regarding the
proper role of the Senate in providing its "advice and consent" and
whether it adequately fulfilled that duty. The influence exerted by special
interest groups could not be denied. Many Senators considered the de-
gree of influence to be unprecedented in a Supreme Court nomination.
Before considering that influence and its effect on the nomination, a brief
review of previous Supreme Court nominees will demonstrate why the
* A.B., College of William and Mary, 1977; J.D., University of Denver, 1981. The
author is currently an Assistant to the Attorney General in the United States Department of
Justice. This Article represents the author's reflections following his participation in the Sen-
ate consideration of the nomination of Robert Bork to be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court. During the Bork hearings, the author was Legislative Counsel to U.S.
Senator Alan K. Simpson (R-Wyo.). The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the
author.
1. 133 CONG. REC. S15,011 (daily ed. Oct. 23, 1987).
2. Id.
3. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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in-depth debate surrounding Bork's nomination ranks high as one of the
most controversial and rancorous confirmation proceedings in history.
I. The Nomination Setting
The Senate had received 143 Supreme Court nominees up to and
including President Reagan's nomination of Robert Bork. Prior to the
Bork nomination, the Senate had refused to confirm twenty-seven nomi-
nees. Twenty-two of those twenty-seven rejections occurred during the
eighteenth or nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, prior to the
Bork nomination, the Senate had voted down three Supreme Court
nominations, filibustered the Fortas nomination as Chief Justice until it
was withdrawn by the President, and did not conclude action on a fifth
nomination, that of Homer Thornberry in 1968.' Not since the nomina-
tion of Clement Haynesworth and G. Harrold Carswell in November
1969 and April 1970, respectively, had a nominee to the Supreme Court
been rejected. With the exception of the Thomberry nomination by
President Johnson (which was withdrawn simultaneously with the Fortas
nomination), Robert Bork was only the fifth nominee to be rejected in
this century.
The Judiciary Committee hearings on Judge Bork were extraordi-
nary. The amount of testimony by Judge Bork before the Committee
was unprecedented for a Supreme Court nominee.' Judge Bork testified
for thirty hours over the course of five days. Another seven days were
spent considering the testimony of 111 other witnesses.' The hearings
were held in the Russell Senate Office Building Caucus Room, the site of
both the Iran-Contra hearings earlier in the session and the Watergate
hearings in the early 1970s. Television and radio carried live a good deal
of the testimony of Judge Bork. Press corps representing all media at-
tended the hearings. Before them paraded an impressive array of wit-
nesses both supporting and opposing the nomination, including former
President Gerald Ford, former Chief Justice Warren Burger, seven for-
mer United States Attorneys General, current and former Congressmen,
numerous law school professors and deans, former White House Counsel
Lloyd Cutler, and a variety of representatives of interest groups.7
Judge Bork's mental ability and "resume" for the job were not in
4. G. WHITE, AMERICAN JUDICIAL TRADITION 424-27 (1988).
5. Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be an Associate Justice of the United States Supreme
Court, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, together with Addi-
tional, Minority, and Supplemental Views, S. EXEC. REP. No. 7, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 215
(1987).
6. Id. at 2.
7. Id. at 100.
question.' Nor was there any question raised by the senators during the
course of the hearings about Judge Bork's personal dealings, which were
revealed to the Judiciary Committee following the mandatory back-
ground investigation by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Instead,
the hearings were mostly consumed by inquiry into Judge Bork's judicial
philosophy.
H. The Interest Groups at Work
One of the major factors separating this nomination from previous
nominations was the effort that interest groups exerted to influence the
outcome of the Senate's vote. The involvement of interest groups in the
legislative process of this country is commonplace. Such groups attempt
to influence every branch of government, seeking increased attention and
assistance for their particular causes. It should not come as a surprise
that this activity extends to presidential appointments of every nature
and especially Supreme Court nominations.
Interest group participation in the nominations process varies with
the post to be filled and the nominee for that post. This is true whether
the post is a federal judgeship, cabinet department office, or independent
agency office. Depending on the type of position to be filled by presiden-
tial appointment, some interest groups have statutory access to the pro-
cess. This has included nominations by the President for membership on
the Railroad Retirement Board, the National Academy of Sciences, the
National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges, the
Coal Mine Safety Board of Review, and the Federal National Mortgage
Association.9 This statutory intervention of interest groups does not ap-
ply, of course, to nomination for the Supreme Court. The only interest
group that comes close to this kind of involvement is the American Bar
Association (ABA). The ABA, as a special interest group for lawyers,
has played an increasingly important role in nominations for the federal
judiciary. It has been standard practice since 1945 for the ABA to evalu-
ate nominees for the Supreme Court.l°
The ABA Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary investigated
and evaluated Judge Bork on his professional competence, judicial tem-
perament, and integrity. The ABA committee did not review the Judge's
8. See generally id. at 217 (Phi Beta Kappa graduate of the University of Chicago; man-
aging editor of the law review at the University of Chicago Law School; Order of the Coif,
partner in a large national law firm; Yale Law School professor; Solicitor General of the
United States; judge on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit).
9. G. MACKENZIE, THE POLICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 206 (1981).
10. Id.
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political or ideological philosophy except to the extent that it might bear
on judicial temperament or integrity.11 When the ABA issued its 1981
report on the nomination of Robert Bork to sit on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Diitrict of Columbia Circuit, it unanimously
provided the Judiciary Committee with its highest approval rating for
federal circuit or district court nominees, that of "exceptionally well
qualified." Seven years later, after reviewing Judge Bork for the Supreme
Court nomination, the ABA again provided its highest approval rating
for Supreme Court nominees of "well qualified."'"
Many interest groups have offered their opinions on previous nomi-
nees to the Supreme Court. Because a nominee is usually accorded a
presumption of confirmation by virtue of the President's selection, the
media certainly and the public generally pay closer attention when inter-
est groups oppose the nomination. The Bork nomination was not unique
when it drew the attention of interest groups. However, the sophistica-
tion and the intensity of the opposition by numerous and varied interest
groups was new.
Parallels can be drawn to the experience of previous nominees, both
successful and unsuccessful, in this century. Labor unions often have
spoken out in opposition to Supreme Court nominees, including the
nomination of Horace Lurton in 1909 and Mahlon Pitney in 1912.'1 Ad-
ditionally, organized labor and the NAACP opposed the confirmation of
John Parker in 1930, Clement Haynsworth in 1969, and G. Harrold
Carswell in 1970.14 Conservative interest groups have opposed nominees
such as Louis Brandeis in 1916, Thurgood Marshall in 1967, and Sandra
11. Letter from Harold R. Tyler, Jr., to Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., (Sept. 21, 1987),
reprinted in Hearings Before the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, One Hun-
dredth Congress, First Session, on the Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 100th Cong., 1st. Sess. 1228-34 (1987) [hereinafter
Hearings].
12. Id. at 1233. More than a little controversy arose out of the ABA report on the nomi-
nation. This was the first time the ABA had a less than unanimous Note for the "well quali-
fied" evaluation of a Supreme Court nominee. Ten members of the ABA committee voted for
the "well qualified" evaluation. One committee member voted "not opposed" and four com-
mittee members voted "not qualified." Id. at 1184. This was deemed highly significant by the
Bork opponents because no Supreme Court nominee had ever received a single "not qualified"
vote from the ABA Committee and then gone on to confirmation by the Senate. See generally
Report, supra note 5, at 4. The proponents of the nomination charged the ABA committee
with violating its own rules forbidding consideration of political or ideological philosophy.
These Senators maintained that there was no justification for the ABA committee's departure
from its unanimous 1981 rating, especially following Judge Bork's five and one-half years of
service on the Circuit Court of Appeals bench. Id. at 221-22.
13. L. BAUM, THE SUPREME COURT 33 (2d ed. 1985).
14. Id.
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Day O'Connor as recently as 1981.15 The nomination of Justice Antonin
Scalia generated opposition from the National Organization for Women,
the AFL-CIO, the Americans for Democratic Action, and the Leader-
ship Conference on Civil Rights.16
Review of a handful of these twentieth century nominees will place
the interest group activity surrounding the Bork nomination in context.
Louis D. Brandeis was nominated by Democratic President Woodrow
Wilson in 1916. His nomination was approved by the Democratic-con-
trolled Senate following a straight party line vote in the Judiciary Com-
mittee, which forwarded the nomination to the Senate on a vote of ten-
to-eight.' 7 The nomination was opposed by powerful members of the
Boston Bar with whom Brandeis practiced law. He had gained a promi-
nent reputation for his representation of socially and economically disad-
vantaged clients while shunning the establishment. As a result, the legal
community in Boston questioned his capacity for judicial temperament
and his ethics in specific cases in which he was involved.18 His enemies
were quite willing to come to the Senate to testify against him. These
Bostonian lawyers were not, however, a well-organized interest group as
we have come to know such groups today. In fact, organized labor sup-
ported the nomination and had been consulted by President Wilson prior
to its submission to the Senate. 9 Brandeis himself believed the opposi-
tion was fueled by anti-Semitism and a perception that he was too radical
to possess judicial temperament.2' Following the Judiciary Committee
recommendation in favor of the nomination, the full Senate voted with-
out debate to confirm. Only one Democrat voted against the nomination
and only three Republicans voted for it.2
The nomination of federal Judge John J. Parker to the Supreme
Court by President Hoover in 1930 provides another example of the in-
fluence that interest groups historically have wielded in the nominations
process. Like Judge Bork, Judge Parker was nominated for elevation to
the Supreme Court from the Circuit Court of Appeals. Like Judge Bork,
Judge Parker was opposed in his nomination by well-organized interest
groups and was attacked for specific case opinions and for statements
made prior to becoming a judge. Specifically, Parker was opposed by
15. Id. at 34.
16. Nomination of Justice Antonin Scalia: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, 99th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 169, 171, 173, 178, 184, 203, 205 (1986).
17. L. PAPER, BRANDEIS 238 (1983).
18. Id. at 227.
19. Id. at 233.
20. P. STRUM, Louis D. BRANDEIS: JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 293 (1984).
21. A. LIEF, BRANDEIS: THE PERSONAL HISTORY OF AN AMERICAN IDEAL 394 (1971).
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organized labor based on a decision he wrote on behalf of a unanimous
court three years prior to his Supreme Court nomination. He was op-
posed by the NAACP for statements he made during an unsuccessful
campaign for Governor of North Carolina ten years prior to the nomina-
tion. As a result, Parker was defeated on a Senate vote of 41 nays to 39
yeas.22
While on the federal bench, Judge Parker wrote 184 opinions. His
decision in International Organization, United Mine Workers of America
v. Red Jacket Consolidated Coal and Coke Co.23 created much hostility
among labor. Judge Parker affirmed in part an injunction that had been
issued by the lower court against violence and other unlawful conduct by
a miners' union in West Virginia. The enjoined union activity included
attempts by union officials to persuade nonunion miners to break so-
called "yellow-dog" contracts, contracts in which the employee agrees
not to join a labor union as a condition of continued employment.24
Parker believed his opinion for the unanimous court adhered to the deci-
sion of the Supreme Court in a previous case as well as previous decisions
of the federal circuit court.25 The union appealed Parker's decision but
the Supreme Court denied the writ of certiorari, to the great surprise of
the United Mine Workers of America attorneys.26 When Parker was
nominated for the Supreme Court, the American Federation of Labor
sought its vindication by opposing the nomination on the basis of
Parker's decision in Red Jacket. During the appellate process, the yellow
dog contract issue had been considered secondary to the issue of alleged
conspiracy activities of the union in violation of the Sherman Act.27 The
contract issue, however, became labor's best tool for generating opposi-
tion during the confirmation process.
As a gubernatorial candidate, Parker had made a statement ten
years prior to his Supreme Court nomination. Commenting on blacks
who had not exercised the right to vote, he stated that "[t]he negro as a
class does not desire to enter politics. The Republican Party of North
22. DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGRAPHY 494 (J. Garraty ed. 1980).
23. 18 F.2d 839 (1927).
24. John J Parker: Senior Circuit Judge: Fourth Circuit, 32 A.B.A. J. 856, 858 (1946).
25. Fish, Red Jacket Revisited: The Case That Unraveled John J. Parker's Supreme Court
,4ppointment, 5 L. & HIST. REV. 50, 84 (1987); Hitchman Coal and Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245
U.S. 229 (1917); Bittner v. West Virginia-Pittsburgh Coal Co., 15 F.2d 652 (4th Cir. 1926);
Mitchell v. Hitchman Coal and Coke Co., 214 F. 685 (4th Cir. 1914); Kinloch Tel. Co. v.
Local Union No. 2, 275 F. 241 (8th Cir. 1921); Montgomery v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 293 F.
680 (9th Cir. 1923).
26. Id. at 98-99.
27. Id. at 82.
Carolina does not desire him to do so."28 Consequently, the NAACP led
a grass roots lobbying campaign against the nomination.29 Decisions
from the judge during his five years on the bench prior to the nomination
had not evidenced racial prejudice.30 Parker defended himself, writing
that the interepretation of his 1920 statement as anti-black was "wholly
unjustified."'" According to contemporaneous observers, nearly all of
those opposed to the nomination came to regret their position and recog-
nize their error.32
Thurgood Marshall was opposed by conservative groups during his
confirmation hearings in 1967. Their most powerful spokesman in the
Senate was Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina. Senator Thur-
mond questioned the nominee on his knowledge and understanding of
Reconstruction era history and the post-Civil War amendments to the
Constitution.33 The NAACP, on the other hand, spoke out in favor of
the nomination.34 Marshall was confirmed overwhelmingly by a vote of
69 to 11 despite criticism that the nominee was too liberal and unquali-
fied for the post. Ten of the eleven "nay" votes were cast by Senators
from the deep South.
Justice Lewis Powell retired with the praise of many Americans for
his exemplary service on the bench. The Chairman of the Judiciary'
Committee called his retirement a "major loss to the court and the na-
tion."3" During the time of his confirmation hearings, however, interest
groups criticized Powell. The Congressional Black Caucus opposed his
nomination in the belief that he was too closely allied with segregation-
ists.36 The National Organization for Women and the National Lawyers'
28. DICTIONARY, supra note 22, at 494.
29. Id
30. Id. Parker remained on the federal bench following his nomination defeat. He subse-
quently wrote the majority opinion in Briggs v. Elliot, 98 F. Supp. 529 (E.D.S.C. 1951), which
applied the "separate but equal" doctrine, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), later struck
down by the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, 347 U.S. 483
(1954). Parker accepted the Brown reversal as the law and followed it. Additionally, during
his judicial career he rendered decisions giving blacks the right to participate in South Carolina
primaries; holding unconstitutional a Virginia ordinance forbidding blacks from owning prop-
erty in white neighborhoods; and upholding lower court desegregation rulings. See The Wash-
ington Post and Times Herald, Mar. 18, 1958, at B2, col 1.
31. N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 1958, at 29, col. 1.
32. Parker, supra note 24, at 858.
33. J. MacKenzie, Thurgood Marshall, in 5 THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES
SUPREME COURT: THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR OPINIONS 386 (L. Friedman ed. 1978).
34. See, eg., N.Y. Times, June 22, 1967, at 38, col. 4 (letter to the editor by Robert L.
Carter, General Counsel, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People).
35. Press statement of Sen. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., undated.
36. Nominations of William H. Rehnquist and Lewis F Powell, Jr.: Hearings Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. at 380 (1971).
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Guild also opposed the Powell nomination. 37 Congressman John Cony-
ers of Michigan led the opposition of the Congressional Black Caucus.
He argued that Powell was unqualified based on his record as President
of the Richmond, Virginia, school board and as a member of the Virginia
State Board of Education. Conyers also cited Powell's membership on
the board of directors of corporations that were allegedly implicated in
racial discrimination and Powell's membership in segregated clubs in
Richmond.38 The Richmond chapter of the NAACP joined Conyers in
opposition. However, the national NAACP did not oppose the nomina-
tion on the belief that Powell's record on race was moderate.
What surprised many Senators and other observers of the Bork
nomination was the level of effort expended by the interest groups. As
just described, organized opposition to and support for confirmation of
Supreme Court justices is not new. The Bork nomination, however, gal-
vanized groups into a nationwide campaign that utilized all modem
methods of political campaigning to create opposition or support in the
home states of the various Senators. These methods included newspaper
advertisements, television ads, mass mailing campaigns, enlistment of
prominent public figures to endorse or discredit the nomination, letters to
newspaper editors and editorials, public opinion polls, public rallies and
protests, bumper stickers, lapel buttons, petitions, charges, and counter-
charges-all intended to influence the vote of the Senators on the nomi-
nation. Both supporters and opponents of the nomination perceived that
this nominee would be helpful or harmful to the particular organized
groups' interests.
III. A Question of Balance
What was it about the Bork nomination that generated such fervor
among interest groups? The answer lies in the basic nature of interest
groups and how they are able to achieve their agenda. Each of the three
branches of government presents an opportunity for an interest group to
accomplish its goals. Like water searching for the path of least resist-
ance, interest groups will seek the path of least governmental resistance.
If the organizations are unable to fulfill their agenda through legislation
or the executive branch then they will focus their efforts on litigation that
may provide a favorable judgment. The conventional wisdom of lobby-
ists holds that chances of obtaining a favorable judgment increase when
judicial nominees are confirmed who are sympathetic, either through ju-
37. Id. at 424, 433, 456, 459.
38. 117 CONG. REc. 41,641 (1971) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
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dicial philosophy or political philosophy, to the causes of the group.
Conversely, if the nominee is perceived as antithetical to the interest
group then that group may mount an effort to prevent the confirmation.
This is especially true for Supreme Court nominees, given the finality of
the Court's rulings.
Not only was Judge Bork seen by the opposition as less likely to
render sympathetic decisions, 39 he was also perceived to be replacing a
Justice who had been an important "swing vote" on the Court. This
perception supported the notion that the successor to Lewis Powell
would not "merely" cast one of the nine votes on decisions, but in fact
hold the deciding vote in five-to-four decisions on perhaps a number of
important social issues coming before the Court in the years ahead.
Shortly following the resignation of Justice Powell, Senate Judiciary
Committee Chairman Joseph Biden issued a statement, calling the resig-
nation a "major loss to the Court and the nation .... [Justice Powell]
understood the meaning of civil rights and liberties."'  Biden expressed
the hope that President Reagan would nominate a replacement "in the
mold of Lewis Powell."41 He called Powell a "decisive vote in a host of
decisions."42 The theme that Justice Powell had been a crucial swing
vote would be raised often during the course of the nomination. Many
Senators wanted a nominee who would be an ideological approximation
of Justice Powell, on the theory that the Court had reached a delicate
ideological balance. The idea that Judge Bork was replacing the swing
vote electrified the interest groups into an historic display of political
pressure.
Both the opponents and proponents of the nomination immediately
began to make public pronouncements. On the same day that the Presi-
dent announced the nomination, Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachu-
39. For example, Bork was denounced as an opponent to the generalized right of privacy
because of his opinion in Dronenburg v. Zech, 714 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984) where he wrote
that it was "impossible to conclude that a right to homosexual conduct" is included within the
Supreme Court's definition of the right to privacy. Id. at 1396. In another case, Judge Bork
was attacked for his decision for a unanimous court in Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers v.
American Cyanimid Co., 741 F.2d 444 (D.C. Cir. 1984). Bork wrote for the court that an
employer had not created a hazard, as defined by the Occupational and Health Safety Act,
when the company policy refused to allow women to work in the lead pigment department
unless the women were beyond childbearing age or sterile. The employer was concerned about
danger to potential fetuses in women exposed to that department. Opponents to the nomina-
tion used the case to label Bork as insenitive to women, at best, and in favor of forced steriliza-
tion, at worst.
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setts took the Senate floor and made the following choleric remarks
about the nomination:
Robert Bork's America is a land in which women would be forced
into back-alley abortions, blacks would sit at segregated lunch
counters, rogue police could break down citizens' doors in mid-
night raids, schoolchildren could not be taught about evolution,
writers and artists would be censored at the whim of government,
and the doors of the Federal courts would be shut on the fingers of
millions of citizens for whom the judiciary is often the only protec-
tor of the individual rights that are the heart of our democracy.43
Senator Metzenbaum did not hesitiate to voice his displeasure with
the nomination, including his opening statement on the first day of hear-
ings in the Judiciary Committee. Senator Metzenbaum stated, "Now it is
clear that the President wants to revise the Constitution through his ap-
pointments to the Supreme Court."'  Metzenbaum also raised the "pres-
ervation of balance" theme in his opening remarks by stating that "[t]he
confirmation of this nominee is likely to tip the Court radically on key
constitutional issues.... Those who kriow Robert Bork know he is not
Lewis Powell, nor I suspect, would he claim to be."45
The White House tried but failed to divert attention away from the
notion that Judge Bork would be the "swing vote" on the Supreme Court
bench. An early attempt was the distribution in July 1987 of a briefing
paper on the nomination. Within that document, circulated to Senators,
was a section dealing with the issue of balance on the Supreme Court. It
argued that the balance theory, as it was called, was an inappropriate
consideration, because it was purely result-oriented in its assumption that
judges are always predictable in their opinions.46
The White House briefing paper also argued that if "judges... were
to confine themselves to interpreting the law as given to them by statute
or Constitution, rather than injecting their own personal predilections,
there would be no need to worry about 'balance on the Court.' ""7 The
document summarized Judge Bork's appointment by stating that he
would not change any balance on the Court because his decisions while
on the court of appeals were "thoroughly in the mainstream," citing as
evidence that Judge Bork had voted in the majority ninety-four percent
of the time.48
43. 133 CONG. REc. S9188 (daily ed. July 1, 1987).
44. Hearings, supra note 11, at 44.
45. Id.
46. Materials on Judge Robert H. Bo rk supplied by the White House (July 30, 1987), see




The next salvo in the balance debate was fired by Senator Biden as
Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Senator Biden agreed that
there was no constitutionally required philosophical balance on the
Supreme Court. He asserted, however, that President Reagan had at-
tempted to "remake the Supreme Court in his own image" (echoing the
statements of Senator Metzenbaum).4 9 Senator Biden asserted that the
direction of the Supreme Court was at stake with the nomination of
Judge Bork. Each Senator had both a right and constitutional duty to
consider Judge Bork's judicial philosophy and then to consider whether
that philosophy would be a desirable addition to the Court.50 Senator
Biden described Justice Powell as a "moderate conservative" who often
cast the swing vote during the term preceding his resignation.51 Senator
Biden declared that the public was well aware that Justice Powell had
been the swing vote. He referred to the comments of conservative group
leaders such as the Moral Majority's Reverend Jerry Falwell, who stated
that the Bork nomination "may be our last chance to influence this most
important body.""
In addition to Reverend Falwell, other prominent conservatives
were quick to support the nomination based on their own perception of
the importance of the Powell vacancy. On the day after the nomination
announcement, Pat McGuigan, representative of the conservative Free
Congress Foundation, stated that the Bork nomination "means that we
have a chance.., for the restoration of the rule of law in the American
system."53 On that same day, conservative activist and fund raiser Rich-
ard Viguerie remarked, "Conservatives have waited over 30 years for this
day .... This is the most exciting news for conservatives since President
Reagan's reelection."54 Similarly, Daniel Popeo, founder of the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation, stated "[w]e have the opportunity now to roll
back 30 years of social and political activism by the Supreme Court." 5
Conservatives made similar comments long before the nomination was
announced. Former Reagan justice department official and legal scholar
Bruce Fein told the press in October 1985, two years prior to the conclu-
sion of the Bork nomination, "It became evident after the first [Reagan]
49. Response Prepared to White House Analysis of Judge Bork's Record, at the request of
Senator Joseph Biden, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, at 10 (September
2, 1987), reprinted in Hearings, supra note 11, at 1651.
50. Id. at 11.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 12.
53. USA Today, July 2, 1987, at 2A, col. 6.
54. Washington Post, July 2, 1987, at A17, col. 3.
55. Id at col. 5.
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term that there was no way to make legislative gains in many areas of
social and civil rights. The president has to do it by changing the
jurisprudence."56
The interest groups opposing the nominee also developed the con-
cept of balance as an important tool in grabbing the attention of their
constituencies and Senators. The acting Executive Director of the People
for the American Way, for example, stated in a letter to Senators that
Justice Lewis Powell "played a key role in forging a consensus on the
Court" and that one of the Senate's fundamental functions in the nomi-
nations process was to "prevent partisan, ideological court packing by a
President determined to remake the Supreme Court to mirror his
views.""7 The AFL-CIO noted on the day that President Reagan an-
nounced his nominee that "on many of the most sensitive issues before
the Court, Justice Powell played a pivotal role." 8 The Leadership Con-
ference on Civil Rights, considered by many to be the leader of the lobby-
ists against Bork, issued a statement within hours of the President's
announcement, that the confirmation of Robert Bork would dramatically
alter the balance of the Supreme Court. 9 Ralph Nader's Public Citizen
issued its report on the record of Judge Bork with a cover letter stating
that an examination of the Bork record was warranted "in this important
nomination to a single 'swing' seat on the Court."'
The newspaper advertisements run by various organizations also de-
voted space to the balance issue. The National Abortion Rights Action
League stated in its newspaper advertisement that if Bork took a seat on
the Court, the "[flair-minded, deliberate, balanced Supreme Court we're
all familar with will be a thing of the past. A right-wing 5-4 majority will
prevail for decades."6 Planned Parenthood emphatically stated in its
advertisement that "[r]etired Justice Powell was the pivot but right-
winger Bork would throw the Court off balance."62 The specter of presi-
dential court-packing was reiterated effectively by the opposition groups.
It helped raise the profile of the issue and raise contributions at the same
time.
56. Press & McDaniel, Judging the Judges, Newsweek, Oct. 14, 1985, at 73.
57. Letter from Jim Scarborough to Senator Alan Simpson (July 13, 1987).
58. Mailgram from Lane Kirkland to AFL-CIO Affiliated National and International Un-
ions (July 1, 1987).
59. Statement of Benjamin L. Hooks, Chairperson, and Ralph G. Neas, Executive Direc-
tor, Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (July 1, 1987).
60. Letter of Joan Claybrook to Sen. Alan Simpson (Aug. 6, 1987).
61. N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1987, at E7.
62. Id., Sept. 14, 1987, at B9.
[¥ol. 17:399
BORK NOMINATION
Both the supporters and detractors of the nominee had within their
ranks those who would resort to the most sensational phrase to entice
both monetary and philosophical support for their cause. The wire serv-
ices carried stories that groups supporting and opposing the Bork nomi-
nation planned to spend millions of dollars.63 Within one week of the
announcement of the nomination, the Executive Director of the People
for the American Way indicated that he intended to raise at least one
million dollars."4 The National Organization for Women stated it would
be spending thousands.65 The National Federation of Business and Pro-
fessional Women's Clubs dedicated one third of its public policy budget
of $250,000 to defeat the nominee.66 The chief lobbyist for the NAACP
stated it could mobilize 12,000 volunteers "in a matter of hours."67 The
Executive Director of the American Civil Liberties Union Foundation
sent a Western Union priority letter on August 31, 1987, including state-
ments such as, "DETAILED RESEARCH REVEALS BORK FAR
MORE DANGEROUS THAN PREVIOUSLY BELIEVED.... WE
RISK NOTHING SHORT OF WRECKING THE ENTIRE BILL OF
RIGHTS.... HIS CONFRIMATION WOULD THREATEN OUR
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT.... TIME IS SHORT .... URGE
YOU TO RUSH EMERGENCY CONTRIBUTION AT ONCE."
68
On the other hand, the conservative Concerned Women for America ac-
tivated phone banks and sent out letters to its 500,000-plus membership,
urging support for the nomination through a letter writing campaign to
Senators.69 The organization "We the People," established specifically to
support the Bork nomination, sought to raise $2 million in sixty days.7"
Citizens for Decency Through Law issued a statement that it had bor-
rowed $140,000 and requested contributions to "[h]elp us defray our ed-
ucational and media costs in this campaign to seat an upstanding
individual-Judge Robert Bork-in the nation's highest court.... Your
gift will block the efforts of the liberals who have had too much influence
for too long."7" The Reverend Jerry Falwell sent out a fundraising letter
stating, "I am issuing the most important 'call-to-arms' in the history of
the Moral Majority .... President Reagan has chosen Judge Robert
Bork... [who is] a pivotal person in getting the Supreme Court back on





68. Business reply letter from the ACLU Foundation (Aug. 31, 1987).
69. Washington Post, July 7, 1987, at A4, col. 2.
70. 133 CONG. Rc. S14,724 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987).
71. Id.
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course.... I need your gift of $50.00 or $25.00 immediately. Time is
short."72
IV. Bork's Judicial Philosophy
Given the perception that Justice Powell was a crucial "swing"
voter, interest groups were particularly interested in reviewing the next
nominee's history of writings, speeches, court opinions, and any other
documents or statements that would indicate how the Powell replace-
ment would exercise that vote. Judge Bork went on record as early as
1971 as strongly opposed to the judicial philosophy and decisions of the
Supreme Court under then-Chief Justice Earl Warren.7 3 During Senate
floor debate, Senator Biden responded to Senator Armstrong of Colorado
who, in Senator Biden's words, had raised the issue of the "astonishing
onslaught"'74 against Judge Bork. As Senator Biden stated in his
response:
So the reason why there was this astonishing onslaught is every-
body understood what is at stake here. This, in a sense, is a refer-
endum on: Do we like what the Court did the last 30 years? Or do
we dislike it?
I would respectfully suggest that the vast majority of Ameri-
can people, liberal and conservative alike, say: We like what the
Court did. Oh, we disagree with pieces but we do not want to turn
back.75
As a general rule, those Senators and interest groups who politically
and philosphically approved of the decisions of the Warren Court op-
posed the nominee. Those interest groups that did not approve of the
Warren Court era joined ranks with like-minded Senators in support of
Judge Bork.
The opposition interest groups were successful in their efforts to de-
feat the nomination because of their extraordinary effort in tandem with
certain Senators. Together they forged an image of Bork that was repul-
sive to other Senators and their constituents. Senator Kennedy was a
primary player in this aspect of the nomination. He described to the
Boston Globe how he coordinated these efforts in an interview that took
place just a few days after a majority of the Senators had announced their
intention to vote against the nominee. Kennedy's tactics included his
opening statement,76 which he intended to be "stark and direct so as to
72. 133 CONG. REC. S14,825 (daily ed. Oct. 22, 1987) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
73. Bork, We Suddenly Feel that Law is Vulnerable, 84 FORTUNE 115-17 (1971).
74. 133 CONG. REc. S14,720 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987) (statement of Sen. Biden).
75. Id.
76. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
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sound the alarm and hold people-in their places until we could get mate-
rial together."77 Kennedy also described his meeting with Senators
Biden, Metzenbaum, and Cranston to define the strategy. It included
delay of the hearings until after the August recess in order to organize
the opposition. This core group then went to work on undecided Sena-
tors. Senator Kennedy began making phone calls to individuals and or-
ganizations to enlist their aid in fighting the nomination. For instance,
he called every one of the thirty executive members of the AFL-CIO,
urging their support in defeating the nomination.78 The interest groups
were responsive to the call.
After sounding the alarm, the opposition packaged Bork's judicial
philosophy in a manner readily transferable to thirty second television
spots, full page newspaper advertisements, and the brief moments avail-
able on nightly news programs. The result was widespread concern
throughout America. This was due in part to the reality that full expla-
nation of complex constitutional principles, crafted from years of prece-
dent and debate, does not lend itself to brief news and advertisement
explanation. Consequently Bork's writings and opinions were reduced to
easily consumed slogans and headlines.
Several large lobbying organizations on both sides of the nomination
excelled at this craft. The skill of the opponents, however, surpassed that
of the pro-Bork forces.79 For instance, the People For The American
Way Action Fund ran a full page advertisement in the New York Times
entitled "Robert Bork vs. The People."8 The advertisement analyzed
several of Judge Bork's opinions, using phrases such as "Sterilizing work-
ers," "No privacy," "Big business is always right," and "Turn back the
clock on civil rights?". 1 Bork's supporters charged People for the
American Way and others with playing fast and loose with the facts and
law of decisions and articles written by Judge Bork, but the advertise-
ments had effectively reached their intended audience.82
77. Boston Globe, Oct. 11, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
78. Id. at 22, col. 5.
79. See Sullivan, The Bork Screw, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 19, 1987, at 14. Sullivan states
that a "serious case" can be made against Judge Bork but that the "liberals get the prize for
hype, even if it's only because the conservatives gave themselves the ridiculous handicap of
defending an innocuous moderate."
80. N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1987, at A21.
81. Id.
82. The focus on specific cases authored by Judge Bork for a majority on the court of
appeals was analogous to the efforts of the American Federation of Labor in the Parker nomi-
nation. Attention was drawn to specific parts of an opinion without particular inquiry into the
underlying legal support for the decision. Judge Parker and Judge Bork were then character-
ized as bad choices for the Court because the decision was contrary to the position advocated
by the interest group.
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Pro-Bork forces made an effort to take the offensive by producing
their own attention-grabbing slogans. Some of these efforts were
bounded only by the limits of the imagination. One organization known
as Free the Court hired an airplane to fly over the Iowa State Fair with a
banner denouncing "Bork Bashers" and "liberal lap dogs."83 The Na-
tional Conservative Political Action Committee (NCPAC) presented
short leashes to anti-Bork "stupid dog" Senators allied with "the looney
left."84 NCPAC also presented choke chains to certain Senators whom
it labeled as having been "jerked around by radical special interest
groups.'"85 Advertisements were also used by Bork's supporters. "We
the People" took out a full page ad in USA Today entitled "The assassi-
nation of Judge Robert Bork: How politics stink and you lose."86 The
advertisement attacked "stunning use of propaganda" by "special inter-
est groups and ambitious politicians." It then went on to attack the per-
sonal character of four Senate Judiciary Committee Democrats.
87
The Senate proponents of Judge Bork failed from the outset to
match the opponents' rhetorical intensity, and the nomination lapsed
into a defensive posture. Little time was left for an offensive push to state
affirmatively the qualifications of the candidate. Rather, the Senators
supporting the nomination were relegated to the task of "crying foul"
and telling other Senators and the public that he was not as bad as some
were saying.
The actions of both opponents and proponents blurred the distinc-
tion between the judicial philosophy and political philosophy of the nom-
inee. Judge Bork affirmed the propriety of reviewing his judicial
philosophy during the hearings.88 It is important to draw a distinction,
however, between inquiry into judicial philosophy and inquiry into polit-
ical philosophy. Judicial philosophy may or may not reflect the political
philosophy of the nominee or the majority of Americans at the time of
the nomination. It is a primary duty of a judge to apply dispassionately
the laws and the Constitution to the facts of the case before him or her
without reference to personal political persuasions. The nomination
failed, in part, because Judge Bork's judicial philosophy, as defined by his
83. 133 CONG. REc. S14,725 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1987).
84. Washington Times, Oct. 9, 1987, at A6, col. 1.
85. Id.
86. USA Today, Oct. 6, 1987, at 9.
87. Id. The advertisement accused Senator Biden of lying and plagiarism. It also noted
Senator Kennedy's involvement in Chappaquiddick and his expulsion from Harvard for cheat-
ing; Senator Metzenbaum's realization of "great wealth by just making a few phone calls"; and
Senator Leahy's leaking of national security information during his tenure on the Senate Intel-
ligence Committee.
88. Hearings, supra note 11, at 105.
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opponents, did not have sufficient popular appeal. In other words,
Bork's judicial philosophy did not adequately reflect the political philoso-
phy of many of the Senators who voted against him.89
Certainly there was no incentive for interest groups on either side of
the nomination to clarify the distinction between judicial philosophy and
political philosophy. To have explained this distinction would have been
an admission by the groups that a judge's duty is to interpret the law
without reference to personal, political philosophy. This in turn would
have been an admission that a judge could thus become unpredictable in
deciding cases, at least as measured in terms of allegiance to one or an-
other political philosophy. Consequently, interest groups on both sides
of the nomination fed the notion that Judge Bork could be counted on-
for good or bad-to take specific, consistent political positions in render-
ing his decisions. This underlying, often unstated presumption was the
foundation of the campaigns waged by.special interest groups. For in-
stance, a statement that it was up to President Reagan to change the
Court in order to make conservative gains in social and civil rights issues,
outside of the legislature, presumes that a majority of the Justices would
adhere to a conservative political philosophy and that philosophy, in
turn, would be converted consistently into conservative majority opin-
ions.90 Similarly, a statement by civil rights activists that Bork's confir-
mation would "jeopardize the civil-rights achievements of the past 30
years" also presumes an unyielding approach to decision making without
reference to underlying facts or changes in statutory or constitutional
law.91 This presumed nexus between political and judicial philosophy by
the presumption of predictable judgment in line with that philosophy is
what led interest groups to mount a classic political campaign strategy in
support of or in opposition to the "candidate," starting with the mobili-
zation of grass-roots support.92 In fact, the high court rulings often frus-
trate these interest group attempts at prediction, due to the tenuous and
often faulty equation between judicial and political philosophy. 93 Per-
haps the best recent example of failed expectations occurred in Texas v.
Johnson.94 The case involved the public burning of an American flag as a
89. Former Attorney General Herbert Brownell warned that requiring a Supreme Court
nominee to conform to the Senate's prevailing political ideology sends the clear signal that the
Court should decide constitutional issues not on judicial and legal bases but rather upon polit-
ical bases. Hearings, supra note 11, at 3840.
90. See supra text accompanying note 56.
91. See supra text accompanying note 54.
92. See supra text accompanying note 69.
93. See Taylor, Rehnquist's Court: Tuning Out the White House, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11,
1988 (Magazine), at 38-41.
94. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
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means of political protest. The supposedly conservative Supreme Court
held that the conviction of the flag burner pursuant to Texas law violated
the First Amendment-a decision roundly criticized by conservative
members of Congress and the President. The five Justices in the majority
formed an unpredictable coalition, consisting of "liberal" Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Blackmun and "conservative" Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. The decision brought on a storm of political rhetoric as mem-
bers of the House and Senate lined up to espouse their patriotic fervor
and their disgust for any decision that would protect a flag burner under
the First Amendment. President Bush called for a constitutional amend-
ment to reverse the decision. Many members of Congress were caught in
the uncomfortable position of trying to reconcile the majority opinion of
the Supreme Court with the political need to decry the decision. It
would have been unlikely that either conservative or liberal interest
groups would have predicted such a decision by the Court given its per-
ceived political balance at the time. The decision exemplifies the lack of
predictability in judicial opinions, the lack of a nexus between judicial
philosophy and political philosophy, and the inability of interest groups
to admit this flaw in their prognostications when seeking financial and
membership support.
V. The Denouement
By October 8, 1987, it was clear that the opponents to the nomina-
tion had sufficient votes to defeat it. The Senate adjourned on that day
for the Columbus Day weekend. Fifty-three Senators had already de-
clared opposition to the confirmation. Thirty-six had announced sup-
port.95 On that same day, Judge Bork issued a statement 96 calling the
use of national political campaign tactics during the confirmation process
not only disturbing but dangerous. He expressed concern regarding the
impact on the impartiality of the judiciary if it is required to comply with
national political ideals and the chilling effect such compliance would
have on judicial deliberations. He also was concerned about the erosion
of public confidence in the impartiality of the courts and the danger to
the independence of the judiciary. President Reagan quoted Judge
Bork's concerns with absolute approval during a television address deliv-
ered just five days later. Yet, in that same address, President Reagan,
after condemning the impact of political campaign tactics on his nomi-
95. Cohodas & Willen, Angry, Defiant Bork Insists on Senate Debate, 45 CONG. Q.
WEEKLY REP. 2435, 2436 (Oct. 10, 1987).
96. Robert Bork, statement delivered at the White House (Oct. 9, 1987), reprinted in N.Y.
Times, Oct. 10, 1987, at 13, col. 1.
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nee, concluded with a request to the audience that they let their Senators
know "that the confirmation process must never again be compromised
with high pressure politics."97 In effect, President Reagan asked Ameri-
cans to put political pressure on their Senators with this message: Don't
bow to political pressure when voting on the Bork nomination.
The White House was ineffective in its handling of key portions of
the Bork nomination and this also played into the hands of the opposing
interest groups. Howard Baker acknowledged the White House knew
that Bork's nomination would be controversial, but it was caught off
guard by the intensity of the advertising campaign waged by the
opponents. 98
Many considered the White House timing of the announcement of
Judge Bork as the nominee to be a crucial error. It afforded the opposing
Senators time to work in coalition with opposition interest groups over
the long August recess, before the first day of hearings had commenced.
President Reagan spent much of the recess on vacation in California and
failed to match the fervor of the opposition. In essence, the White House
seemed only lukewarm toward the nomination. It departed from the
"high ground" of judicial independence from political influence by mak-
ing some effort to "politic" on behalf of Bork, but it failed to expend
enough energy to meet the efforts of the opposition.
A. B. Culvahouse, Jr., counsel to President Reagan, acknowledged
that part of the error lay with the White House strategy. He noted the
long delay in the hearings and the time provided to the opponents to
mount their campaign.99 Culvahouse admitted that the White House did
not think the process would become as politically oriented as it did. He
indicated that had the White House realized this sooner then perhaps the
confirmation battle would have been fought out on "raw political
terms"-with a different result.1°°
Conclusion
We will not know whether this combination of events leading to
defeat for the nominee will be repeated until the Senate finds itself in
similar circumstances. Those circumstances did not occur with the nom-
ination of Justice Kennedy. The Senate Judiciary Committee received
the President's nomination of then-Judge Kennedy on November 30,
97. Presidential Television Address to the Nation, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1171,
1173 (Oct. 19, 1987).
98. N.Y. Times, Oct. 8, 1987, at Al, col. 2.
99. Quade, The President is His Only Client, BARRISTER, Spring 1988, at 34.
100. Id.
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1987. ' He was confirmed by a vote of ninety-seven to zero on February
3, 1988.102 The Senators who had rejected the Bork nomination were
willing to vote unanimously in favor of the Kennedy nomination. The
Senate Judiciary Committee apparently was ready to move more quickly
on the Kennedy nomination. In fact, some interest groups complained
that they were unable to prepare adequately for the hearings or analyze
the Kennedy judicial record of service on the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Additionally, Justice Kennedy did not leave a trail of nonjudi-
cial writings which had provided so much fodder for the opponents to
the Bork nomination. Justice Kennedy had published very little outside
of his judicial opinions and had given only a few speeches.
Critics have speculated since the conclusion of the Bork hearings
that fundamental changes are necessary in the Senate process of advice
and consent. A ten-member Task Force on Judicial Selection established
by the Twentieth Century Fund and headed by former Democratic New
York Governor Hugh Carey made recommendations to prevent future
influence upon judicial nominations by an overt political process. The
Task Force concluded that "nominees ought not to be associated with
some special interest group's political agenda.... For that is at war with
the Constitution and the tradition of judicial independence." ' 103
Part of the problem occurs when the Senate is required to set aside
its political nature and enter into "executive session" to consider the
nomination of an individual for a federal judgeship. Pursuant to Senate
rules, the Senate leaves legislative session and enters executive session
when considering a presidential nomination. 1" The reality is that many
of the normal political biases in Senate debate on legislation are main-
tained and exercised during the executive session consideration of
Supreme Court nominations. The interest groups in opposition to the
Bork nomination were more successful than proponents in engaging the
attention of the constituents of many Senators. Through the use of cam-
paign tactics-calls, letters, rallies, and the like-these interest groups
and their constituents reminded Senators that they were politically op-
posed to the Bork nomination and therefore the Senators should also be
101. Nomination of Justice Anthony M. Kennedy to be an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court, Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, together
with Additional and Supplemental Views, S. EXEC. REP. No. 13, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 2
(1988).
102. 134 CONG. REc. S516 (daily ed. Feb. 3, 1988).
103. David M. O'Brien, Judicial Roulette, Report of the Twentieth Century Fund Task
Force on Judicial Selection 106 (1988) (background paper). But see id. at 98 (interest groups
should continue to have the opportunity to fully involve themselves in the hearings of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on judicial nominees).
104. Standing Rules of the Senate, Rule XXXI (1984).
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opposed. As a result, a sufficient number of undecided Senators an-
swered the political call when exercising their duties in executive session.
Votes against Judge Bork were cast accordingly.
The only certainty seems to be that interest-group campaigning for
or against nominees will continue in the future. Opposition groups have
been successful in the Parker, Haynsworth, Carswell, and Bork nomina-
tions and were nearly successful in the Brandeis nomination. Interest
groups have every incentive to continue to raise their voices in the hope
of persuading Senators to cast nomination votes in accordance with the
agenda of the particular group. When a group or coalition of groups can
influence the nomination outcome, it may be one less obstacle they have
to face in the course of litigation. This, however, assumes that the
Supreme Court Justices can be relied upon consistently to apply political
philosophies to their decision making. That debate has gone on since the
beginning of the Court and will no doubt continue. Yet, there is evidence
to suggest that Justices are far more independent of their nominating
President's party and politics than some would believe. 105
Popular election of Supreme Court Justices would be contrary to the
Constitution.10 6 The efforts of the interest groups, however, in the Bork
nomination and others, informed Senators that many Americans were
supporting or opposing the nomination. This support or opposition was,
in turn, generated by the work of the interest groups in forging a certain
image of the nominee. Thus, the interest groups have been successful in
achieving indirectly that which they would have been prohibited from
doing had they sought a direct election. This raises a compelling argu-
ment against senatorial collusion with interest groups in reviewing the
qualifications of Supreme Court nominees-an argument that is not
likely to be persuasive to most Senators. If a Senator were to ignore the
advice of constituents and interest groups on such matters, he might
properly fulfill his constitutional duty but he would face possible retribu-
tion in the next election. Nor are special interest groups likely to reduce
their attempts to influence Senators regarding important Presidential
nominations. We are left then with the somewhat unsettling reliance on
Senators to understand the dual responsibility imposed by the Constitu-
tion-to act as a legislative branch, properly answering to the political
desires of their constituents, while still maintaining the ability to review
dispassionately and apolitically the qualifications of Supreme Court nom-
inees in executive session on the Senate floor.
105. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
106. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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